Japan

The live 12-month probability is 0.5%, a minimal risk. Japan’s strong state institutions, advanced economy, capable security services, and long postwar record without civil war, insurgency, or interstate fighting on its territory support this low level. Japan’s alliance network and effective territorial defence also make sustained armed violence against the state difficult to initiate.

Recent reporting shows sharper security pressure but no armed conflict on Japanese soil. China condemned the reported 31 August intrusion into its embassy in Tokyo by a Japanese Self-Defense Force officer carrying a knife, while Japan’s proposed 8.9 trillion yen defence budget would expand drones, artificial intelligence, and missile capabilities. Reports that US assets based in Japan were used in operations against Iran add diplomatic exposure, but do not themselves constitute fighting in Japan.

The main uncertainty is whether tensions involving China, the United States, and Japan could convert a maritime, air, or political confrontation into an attack reaching Japanese territory. A confirmed armed incident around the Senkaku Islands, the southwest islands, or a major attack on a Japanese base would raise risk; sustained crisis de-escalation and continued institutional control would lower it.