Taiwan

The live 12-month probability is 0.7%, making this a minimal risk. Taiwan’s capable institutions, advanced economy, effective armed forces, and substantial international support reduce the likelihood that tensions become a new armed conflict on its territory. Taiwan has not experienced a sustained internal armed conflict in the modern democratic era, although its unresolved sovereignty dispute with China remains a persistent external danger.

Recent reporting supplied for this assessment contains no specific new military or political development. The principal actors remain China’s People’s Liberation Army and government, Taiwan’s government and armed forces, and the United States and regional partners whose support strengthens deterrence. Prediction markets provide separate context: contracts imply 3.9% for a Chinese invasion by the end of 2026 and 6.6% for a China–Taiwan military clash before 2027, while the near-term invasion contract through September 30 implies 0.9%.

The largest uncertainty is whether Beijing would shift from coercive pressure to an attack, blockade, or other operation that reaches Taiwan’s territory. Risk would rise most clearly after a sustained PLA mobilisation accompanied by an explicit ultimatum or blockade; it would fall with durable cross-Strait communication and a verified reduction in military pressure.