Equatorial Guinea

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Equatorial Guinea is 0.7%, a minimal risk. The main supporting factors are the country’s long-standing authoritarian rule, concentrated political power, weak institutions, and history of coups, attempted coups, and separatist unrest. These conditions create latent vulnerability, although sustained domestic warfare has not been a persistent feature of recent decades.

Recent reporting highlights geopolitical pressure rather than fighting on Equatorial Guinean territory. A Washington Examiner analysis on China’s possible Atlantic military base links the issue to declining oil production, while reports on third-country deportation arrangements mention Equatorial Guinea without indicating armed violence. The relevant actors are the Equatorial Guinean government, China, and the United States; no armed group is reported to be mobilising domestically.

The largest uncertainty is whether elite or security-force disputes could turn political tension into organised violence. Risk would rise most clearly with a coup attempt, armed separatist activity, or foreign military construction provoking confrontation; it would remain lower if political control holds and external competition stays diplomatic. No prediction market is available for this country.