Chad

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Chad is 36.9%, representing a critical risk. The main supporting factors are Chad’s long history of rebellions, coups, and insurgencies; weak political institutions; limited economic capacity; and dependence on coercive security structures. Authority remains heavily concentrated, while contested succession and exclusionary politics have repeatedly created openings for armed opposition.

Recent developments most relevant to this risk include the continuing political and security effects of Sudan’s war along Chad’s eastern border, where refugee flows, cross-border ethnic ties, and weapons networks can transmit instability. Chad’s principal actors include the transitional government and security forces, armed opposition groups, communities in the east and north, and Sudanese factions operating near the frontier. No prediction market is available for Chad.

The largest uncertainty is whether political grievances and regional insecurity combine into sustained organised violence inside Chad rather than remaining localised or external. Risk would rise if armed groups mobilised domestically, a major attack exposed state weakness, or fighting in Sudan spilled across the border. It would fall with a credible political accommodation, effective border control, and durable restraint among domestic armed actors.