Sudan

The live 12-month probability is 25.1%, representing a critical risk. Sudan’s prolonged history of civil war, military rule, weak institutions, limited economic capacity, and fragmented armed authority leave the country highly vulnerable to a distinct new outbreak of organised violence, even while the current war is excluded from the onset definition. Competition between armed centres of power and longstanding regional grievances further increase exposure.

Recent reporting shows severe deterioration in El Obeid and surrounding displacement camps as civilians flee fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Anti-war representatives have also warned the UN envoy that Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s proposed dialogue could entrench rival authorities and deepen division. These developments involve the principal national actors and reinforce the risk of further territorial fragmentation.

The largest uncertainty is whether diplomacy can contain existing armed competition or instead produces competing administrations and fresh local fronts. A credible, inclusive ceasefire and political settlement would lower risk; renewed SAF-RSF expansion, breakdown of dialogue, or mobilisation by additional regional and communal armed actors would raise it. Polymarket gives a 9.5% probability to a civil-war ceasefire by 31 December 2026, providing separate market context.