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Silfio country intelligence · TUR
Türkiye
10.1% annual probability85.88M
$1.6T
TRY
Ankara
783.56K km²
Turkish
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The live 12-month probability is 10.1%, a high risk. Turkey’s history of insurgency involving the PKK, political violence, military intervention, and repeated conflict along its borders supports meaningful exposure to a new domestic or interstate onset. Its large armed forces and state capacity are important safeguards, but persistent internal polarisation and unresolved Kurdish issues remain relevant vulnerabilities.
Recent reporting shows sharper regional friction involving Turkey. Israel’s 29 August strike on a Syrian base reportedly sought to prevent a feared Turkish deployment, while President Erdoğan’s 1 September rhetoric presented Turkey as more militarily capable and sharply condemned Israel. Turkey and Greece also clashed over protected marine areas in a disputed Aegean zone. These developments involve Israel, Syria, Greece, and Turkey, but do not themselves establish fighting on Turkish territory.
The largest uncertainty is whether regional competition or a renewed Kurdish confrontation crosses into sustained violence inside Turkey. The Polymarket indicators provide separate context: markets implied 13.5% for an Israel–Turkey clash and 5.2% for Greece–Turkey engagement by year-end, both partial-scope measures. Risk would rise most clearly after a cross-border attack reaching Turkey or sustained armed attacks by domestic actors; restraint in the Aegean and regional channels would lower immediate pressure.
Strategic reasoning
- Turkey’s record of PKK insurgency, political violence, and military-led political crises means domestic armed conflict can re-emerge despite substantial state capacity. Unresolved Kurdish grievances and polarisation preserve this pathway.
- Israel’s action against a Syrian base and increasingly confrontational Turkish rhetoric create an escalatory regional setting, but the reported fighting remains outside Turkey. This distinction matters because foreign operations alone do not constitute a new onset on Turkish territory.
- Turkey’s strong security institutions, military capability, and established diplomatic channels with Greece and other regional actors provide mechanisms to contain incidents before they become sustained fighting inside the country.
Critical indicators
- On 29 August 2026, The New York Times reported that Israel struck a Syrian base to pre-empt a feared Turkish deployment, highlighting direct strategic competition between Israel and Turkey around Syria. The event raises the possibility of miscalculation but occurred outside Turkish territory.
- On 1 September 2026, Erdoğan said Turkey was “no longer the old Turkey,” described Zionism as a genocidal ideology, and called for Muslim unity. The rhetoric reinforces regional confrontation while stopping short of evidence of armed conflict inside Turkey.
- In late August 2026, Turkey announced protected zones in a disputed Aegean area, prompting an angry Greek reaction. Polymarket priced Israel–Turkey military clash risk at 13.5% and Greece–Turkey engagement at 5.2%, partial-scope indicators of external pressure rather than proof of a new conflict onset.
Probability trend
How the Türkiye estimate has moved
Aug 26
Aug 31
Sep 1
Date
Regional context
Türkiye compared with its neighbours and region
Türkiye ranks number 37 of 195 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
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