Burkina Faso

The live 12-month probability is 9.1%, representing a high risk of a new armed-conflict onset in Burkina Faso. Repeated coups, weak civilian institutions, limited state capacity, economic fragility, and a long history of political and communal violence support this level. The country is also affected by an established jihadist insurgency, which demonstrates persistent armed mobilisation and strains the government’s control, though continuation or intensification of that conflict is not itself a new-onset event.

Recent reporting highlights the vulnerability of the wider Sahelian junta system. A thwarted mutiny in neighbouring Niger has exposed dependence on Russian security support, while Burkina Faso’s military government remains closely associated with the same regional alignment. Separately, Libya’s state-owned Foreign Bank has taken Burkina Faso to a World Bank arbitration tribunal after the government nationalised their jointly owned commercial bank, adding pressure around governance and external relations.

The largest uncertainty is whether military cohesion and regional security partnerships can contain existing pressures without opening a distinct internal or interstate front on Burkinabè territory. Risk would rise if a coup attempt, major armed-group realignment, or cross-border incident produced sustained fighting inside Burkina Faso; it would fall if the authorities consolidated command structures and resolved major disputes without violence.