Colombia

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Colombia is 1.8%, a low risk. Colombia’s long history of civil conflict, persistent armed-group activity, and difficult state control in some rural and border areas remain important background factors. These risks are moderated by comparatively capable national institutions, a functioning security apparatus, and substantial economic capacity.

Recent reporting highlights Colombian security forces’ capture of a suspected senior Tren de Aragua leader, announced by U.S. Southern Command, amid stronger military ties between Bogotá and Washington. The earthquake-related mobilisation reported on 29 August is not conflict evidence. Existing criminal and insurgent violence remains relevant context, but fighting already underway does not itself constitute a new conflict onset.

The principal uncertainty is whether armed groups, cross-border pressures, or a serious rupture in Colombia’s relations with external actors could broaden into sustained violence on Colombian territory. Prediction markets separately price a U.S. strike on Colombia by 31 December at 29.5%, while a U.S. invasion in 2026 is priced at 2.1%; these contracts signal divergent expectations about possible external escalation. A confirmed cross-border attack or major breakdown in state control would raise risk, while continued effective security cooperation and containment would lower it.