Guinea-Bissau

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Guinea-Bissau is 2.5%, a low risk. The main underlying supports are the country’s history of military intervention, weak civilian institutions, political fragmentation, and limited state capacity. Guinea-Bissau’s 1998–99 civil war and repeated coups show that disputes among political and security elites can escalate into armed confrontation, although sustained nationwide conflict has not been the norm.

The strongest current evidence is the referendum held on 30 August 2026, ten months after a military coup. Military leaders say it will stabilise future civilian governments, while reporting describes proposals to strengthen the presidency ahead of elections intended to restore civilian rule later this year. The armed forces and transitional authorities are therefore the principal actors, with political parties and former civilian leaders central to the dispute.

The largest uncertainty is whether the referendum and transition consolidate authority or intensify rivalry between military and civilian elites. A disputed result, delayed elections, renewed military intervention, or armed mobilisation around the presidency would raise risk; an accepted result followed by a credible handover to civilian government would lower it. Polymarket assigned a 98.9% probability to the referendum passing, but those contracts have no armed-conflict scope.