Russia

The live 12-month probability is 31.4%, representing a critical risk. Russia’s history of internal armed conflict, including the Chechen wars and the Wagner mutiny, combines with concentrated political power, extensive militarisation, and prolonged war-related economic and social pressures. These factors support the possibility that violence could newly reach or arise on Russian territory, even though Russia’s forces are primarily fighting abroad.

Recent reporting shows continued escalation in the Russia–Ukraine war, including nearly 1,500 Russian drones launched over four days and Moscow’s preparation of large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities. Reports of Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure and warnings of possible Russian hybrid action against Britain show widening confrontation, while the ICBM test highlights heightened strategic signalling. Prediction markets separately imply 23.5% for a NATO–Russia clash by year-end and 4.6% for a US–Russia clash.

The largest uncertainty is whether the external war produces sustained armed violence inside Russia rather than isolated sabotage, strikes, or security incidents. Risk would rise with a coordinated insurgent or coup attempt, repeated attacks causing prolonged disruption, or direct NATO–Russia hostilities reaching Russian territory; it would fall with a durable ceasefire and demonstrable containment of violence within Ukraine.